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ABSTRACT 
This paper provides an empirical investigation of the agency relationship between the public sector and 
small firms targeted for assistance by examining micro and macro data for a cross section of eligible women 
business enterprises (WBEs). Using hedonic sales and employment indices we find that 2% of firm sales is 
lost to negative gender externality. We show that under asymmetric information public sector transfers 
neither compensate for this loss of sales nor do they increase employment. When we impose transfer 
restrictions under perfect information, sales is unaffected but firms respond by increasing the amount of part 
time employees hired and do not increase full time employment. Moreover, we show that WBE presence at 
the state level depend on prime-contractor-sub-contractor relationships and that if long term contracts are 
offered then business risks are reduced and firms increase employment levels because of securitized sales. 
Further, formation of new WBEs are directly proportional to the amount of new small business loans 
provided in the economy after controlling for size and population effects. The evidence suggests that after 
President Richard Nixon signed Executive Order 11625 the velocity of new WBE formation is 
approximately 39% of the difference between policy targets and actual realization. We introduce an 
entrepreneurial reaction function which shows that firms react to private and public sector funding 
incentives but not to the level of education attainment and overall business formation in the economy. We 
find that agency problems provide incentives for firms to engage in strategic misrepresentation. Thus, the 
incidence of adverse selection in current transfer programs are as high as 60% in some instances; imposes 
an asymmetric residual loss on the public sector, and contrary to the goals of benevolent policy, transfers 
are skewed in favor of less needy firms.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 Small firms are one of the fastest growing segments of the business community in the United 
States. According to statistics extracted from the United States Enterprise and Establishment 
Microdata (USEEM), in 1982, approximately 94.2 percent of all manufacturing firms had less than 
100 employees. Further, they accounted for 16.5 percent of employment and 12.1 percent of sales 
nationwide (see Acs and Audretsch (1990), pp: 61-63)1. However, due to scale effects (Weiss 
(1976)), and relatively higher cost of capital (Stoll (1984), Andrews and Eismann (1984)) some of 
these entities are at a competitive disadvantage vis-a-vis larger and more established conglomerates. 
For instance, research has shown that small firms face liquidity constraints and higher debt 
financing costs that stymie timely completion and implementation of projects and abet sub-optimal 
capital labor ratios (Evans and Jovanovic (1989) and Fazzari, Hubbard, Peterson (1987)). These 
disadvantages are not new. During the Post World War II period, many studies investigated the 
impact of monetary policy on small business access to credit (e.g., McHugh and Ciaccio (1955), 
Federal Reserve System Report (1958), Stockwell and Byrnes (1961)). By and large, they found 
that next to self financing, bank credit was the key factor affecting small business investment and 
development2 (see Cox, Elliehausen and Wolken (1989)). 
 The incipience of current public policy towards small firms occured in 1953 when Congress 
instituted the United States Small Business Administration (USSBA or SBA as it is more 
commonly known), as part of the Small Business Act, in order to alleviate some of the 
disadvantages and provide technical and managerial assistance for small businesses to facilitate 
procurement of government loans and contracts. A funding component was later added through the 
Small Business Investment Company Act of 1958 (SBIC). That piece of legislation was designed to 
foster public-private sector partnerships by permitting the SBA (1) to grant licenses to private 
                                                     
1 Recent work by Davis, Haltiwanger and Schuh (1993) questions the commonly held beliefs that small firms are 
largely responsible for job creation in the economy. 
2Recently, Gertler and Gilchrist (1993) showed that short term credit flows decline for small firms after tight monetary 
policy but actually increase for large firms. Thereby, lending credence to theories that posit financial propagation 
mechanisms in business cycle studies. 
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sector investment companies and (2) to provide SBA guaranteed debt over and above the private 
capital input of licensed investment companies. SBICs use their pool of private capital and SBA 
leverage to provide long term financing and equity capital for small firms. According to the 
Investment Advisory Council (IAC) report to the SBA (1992a), between 1959 and 1991, SBICs 
disbursed $8.5 billion in long term capital to over 55,600 firms, of which approximately 31% of 
disbursements were SBA backed debt. 
Figure 1(a): SBIC 301(d) Financing of Small Firms 
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Source: Extrapolated from various issues of SBIC Digest. The data for 1972-1974 were estimated from 
backcasting and that for 1990-1991 was estimated from a state space forecast of the three series. 
 In 1969, Specialized Small Business Investment Companies (SSBICs) were formed to address 
the special needs of Women Business Enterprises (WBEs), Minority Business Enterprises (MBEs) 
and otherwise economically disadvantaged firms. According to the IAC Report to the SBA (1992a), 
as of 1991, about 14,000 such firms received some type of funding from SSBICs. The role of 
SSBICs was expanded in 1972 when President Richard M. Nixon signed Executive Order 11625 to 
foster (in part) the development of otherwise "disadvantaged business enterprises". The distribution 
of SBIC funding over a 20 year span is depicted in Figure 1(a). Due to increased bureaucracy 
induced by public sector procedures, the Office of Advocacy for the SBA was established in 1976 
to reduce the debilitating effect of government red tape on small firms. Moreover, in response to the 
onslaught of regulation implemented in the early 1970s, the Economic Policy Act of 1980 was 
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passed to enable Congress to monitor the state of small business via annual reports from the 
President. 
 Most empirical studies on small firm finance and entrepreneurship focus on determinants of 
capital structure and characteristics of business owners (e.g. Constand, Osteryoung and Nast 
(1991), Bates (1990,1991), Walker (1989), Fairlie and Meyer (1992)). Other studies such as Holtz-
Eakin, Joulfain and Rosen (1992, 1994) and Meyer (1990) examine the impact of wealth and or 
inheritance on entrepreneurial choice. In the literature on firm growth Lucas (1978) and Jovanovic 
(1982) (among other things) examined entrepreneurial decisions and their impact on heterogenous 
firm size to explain why smaller firms grow faster than larger firms in the same industry. Recently, 
Prager (1993) provided a qualitative assessment of an outsourcing agency problem in the public 
sector by examining the role of scale, scope, organization, competition and management in the 
selection of contractors to do the job(s). This study differs from earlier studies in many ways. 
Specifically, it uses a unique dataset of a cross section of women owned firms that qualify for 
public sector transfers under some of the programs outlined earlier. Secondly, it provides an 
empirical analysis of an agency problem between the public sector and small firms by analyzing the 
effects of transfers designed to compensate for negative externalities and increase the growth of 
targeted firms. Thirdly, it utilizes marco data to assess firm response at the national level to various 
public sector financial and contracting incentives. Fourthly, it provides an empirical investigation of 
the impact of asymmetric information on the effectiveness of the transfer mechanisms used to 
provide assistance for these firms. In particular, we provide an ex-post analysis of adverse selection 
in the transfer program. 
 To underscore the timeliness and importance of this study we note that women owned 
enterprises increased from 5% in 1972 to 30% of all firms in 1989 (Nelton (1989)) with an 
estimated growth rate of 57% between 1982 and 1987 - twice that of men owned firms (Brush 
(1992)). According to a recent SBA Report (1992b), approximately 12% of SBA loan recipients 
went to 100% wholly owned WBEs and about 35% went to recipients that had at least one female 
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part owner. Further, approximately half of all firms in the U.S. will be female owned by the year 
2000 (Olson and Currie (1992)). Several factors contribute to the success and explosive growth of 
WBEs. According to Granger, et alia (1993) many of these firms began by "pulling themselves up 
from the bootstrap" with personal resources, small business loans from commercial banks and 
government financing from (SBICs). Some analysts believe that so called government setaside 
contracts and SBA certification status are needed to sustain this growth because women experience 
gender bias in their quest to procure new business and obtain start-up capital (see Nelton (1993), 
NAST Review (1993), Venture Capital Journal (1992)). For instance, Bates (1994) provides 
evidence that state and local government assistance seems to be skewed toward women business 
owners and that small firms do benefit from such assistance. Other studies show that women are not 
discriminated against by bank officials when they apply for small business loans (see Buttner and 
Rosen (1992) and the references therein). Moreover, some non-profit and research organizations 
provide counsel for women interested in starting their own businesses and some private venture 
capitalists specialize in funding WBEs3. 
 In keeping with the guidelines of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve (1980), a 
small firm in this study refers to one with less than 500 employees. However, most of the firms in 
the micro data set actually have less than 100 employees so that selection criteria is easily satisfied. 
The empirical analyses in this paper is based on a spectrum of econometric models implemented as 
follows. Section II, presents the research methodology and describes the associated hypotheses 
developed to test the relationship between public sector contract and incentive activity and WBE 
development. It also provides a brief demonstration of the liquidity constraint argument mentioned 
earlier. In Section III, a brief description of the data is provided followed by empirical results and 
                                                     
3 Vizly, the National Education Center for Women in Business located at Seton Hill College in Greensberg 
Pennsylvania recently received a grant from the federal government to provide research and education for Women 
Owned Businesses. Similarly, the National Women's Business Council in Washington D.C. is also set up to provide 
assistance. Among venture capitalists, Capital Missions Company, St. Charles, Illinois and Ark Capital Management, 
Chicago, Illinois are two entities that specialize in securing funding for Women Owned Businesses. In fact Ark Capital 
Management introduced a novel fund of funds concept to steer venture capital towards WBEs. Similarly, according to 
The Private Equity Analyst (August 1993) Fairview Capital Partners, L.P., in Farmington, Connecticut, showed that the 
return to limited partners from a sample of SSBICs averaged 17% after expenses - an attractive return by any standard. 
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stylized facts about associated business risks. Some policy recommendations are proposed to 
increase the stability and viability of these firms by reducing business risks. In Section IV the 
empirical results for the research questions are presented and an hedonic sales and employment 
indexes are introduced to test for incidence of gender bias across industries. Diagnostics from 
robust small sample pretest procedures are included in the Appendix. Section V is the summary and 
conclusion. 
II. METHODOLOGY 
 The first hypothesis investigated provides a weak form test (to be explained later) of the impact 
of federal contract actions at the state level on the development of WBEs in those states. To 
conduct this test we regress the number of adult women in the state(s), WBE ownership rates and 
Federal Contract Actions in those states, on the number of WBEs in the state(s). If federal contract 
actions at the state level are an integral part of the income of women businesses in those states, then 
we would expect them to be a significant explanatory variable in the model. Even though the model 
controls for size effects by including the population of women in the states as an instrument for 
state size, it may well be that state size is unrelated to federal contract activity. For instance, 
political clout of Congressional Representatives maybe a better indicator. Moreover, due to 
shortcomings in the data the model does not account for other characteristics of business owners 
such as education and personal resources used for start-up capital which also help to explain small 
business development (see Bates (1990), Farlie and Mayer (1992)). Because these variables were 
not available, and hence omitted from the model, the test is necessarily weak form. 
 The second hypothesis examines the effect of federal contract actions at the state level on sales 
and receipts of women owned firms in those states when the regressors are the same as those from 
the first hypothesis. In this Multiple Indicator model, if federal contract actions are a significant 
component of sales and receipts then one would expect them to be significant in the model. Here 
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again, this is a weak form test since there are other factors such as private sector contracts that also 
determine sales and receipts and other indicators may also qualify as dependent variables4. 
 Hypothesis number three takes place at the micro level where we employ a unique dataset of a 
cross section of women owned firms to identify evidence of negative externality (due to gender bias 
against these firms) and the impact of public policy in addressing this problem. To assess the 
impact of public sector contracts and policy at the firm level we introduce the notion of weak and 
strong benevolent policy by including certain policy interaction terms in the model and imposing 
restrictions on others. We say that a benevolent policy is weak when there is ineffective public 
sector transfers that 'throws money' at small firms but fails in its attempt to compensate for negative 
externalities. Strong benevolent policy occurs when certain restrictions are imposed on the model 
so that government policy is forced to provide the full compensation needed to eliminate negative 
externalities. The impact of these policies are examined in the context of hedonic sales and 
employment indices. The hedonic sales index is constructed with regressor variables comprising 
firm demographics such as female ownership threshold, firm age and quality measures such as 
amount of services provided, number of pieces of equipment and square footage of floor space for 
the home office. If the threshold of female ownership is significant and negatively correlated with 
sales then firms with higher levels of female ownership will have lower sales and receipts. 
Therefore this test provides a weak form measure of gender bias because other factors such as 
industry decline and poor management may also explain lower sales. The model attempts to control 
for some of those scenarios via an instrument for business experience, namely, firm age or length of 
stay in business. The model is extended to include strong and weak benevolent policy variables 
mentioned earlier. The hedonic employment index is similar to the hedonic sales index except that 
the dependent variable is no longer the log of sales but the log of the number of full and or time and 
or part time workers employed by the firm, accordingly. 
                                                     
4 It should be noted that in many cases private sector contracts include Women and or Minority Owned Businesses as 
sub-contractors either voluntarily or in accordance with government request for proposal (RFP) guidelines. This would 
be included in the residual and or "unexplained error term" in the model. 
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 Finally, the fourth hypothesis examines the relationship between the rate of new business 
formation for WBEs and the amount of SBA loans provided in corresponding states and or 
jurisdictions. A simple stock adjustment model is used to investigate whether the level of new WBE 
formation depends on the level of SBA loan activity in prior periods. If those variables depicting 
SBA activity are significantly correlated with WBE formation then one may conclude that SBA 
policies play a key role in the growth and development of small businesses nationwide. The model 
is motivated by an intertemporal liquidity constraint argument depicted in Figure 1 (b)5. In that set 
up the firm has an investment utility function U( . ) and an endowment of funds Yt  at time t. When 
there are liquidity constraints the firm would like to be on the U 2 utility curve but is constrained to 
stay on the U 1 curve regardless of the interest rate for loanable funds (rt ) at time t. In that case 
I I Yt t t 
0  and the firm invests all of its time t endowment. At U 3 the firm does not experience 
liquidity constraints and it can trade-off between current and future investment in its intertemporal 
budget constraint equation I I r Yt t t t  1 1( ) . The familiar intertemporal rate of substitution 
between present and future investment is     U U rt t t1 1 1( ) ( ) , where   is the subjective 
discount rate. Mathematically, the derivatives do not exist at the corner of the budget constraint so 
                                                     
5 For a more detailed empirical analysis on this issue with respect to small firms see Rhyne (1988). 
Figure 1(b): Liquidity Constraint Argument 
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there is no intertemporal substitution for liquidity constrained firms. Nonetheless, larger firms tend 
to operate at the U 3 level and smaller firms at the U 1 level. One of the goals of public sector 
policies in this case is to provide more liquidity for the U 1 firms in the amount of I It t
0 via some 
transfer scheme6. In this paper, the mechanism employed by the public sector consists of 
certification status after some screening process in order for firms to qualify for procurement of so 
called setaside contracts and other compensation for negative externality7. 
 A corollary to the stock adjustment model was implemented in the form of an entrepreneurial 
reaction function. That set up was used to check whether lagged values of private and public sector 
policy variables had predictive powers in explaining the formation of new firms. We also subject 
this model to a simple instrumental variable (IV) specification test to see whether or not selected 
instruments are orthogonal to the entrepreneurial information set. If the model is well specified then 
it should not be sensitive to variables in the time t-1 information set of entrepreneurs. 
 Finally, we introduce a de facto certification scoring model to mimic possible decision rules of 
public sector implementation of the loan and contract transfer mechanism. For instance, we 
compare results from a naive decision rule in which firms are given a 50-50 chance of selection in 
the program. This is compared to an adaptive decision rule in which the historical acceptance rate is 
used to compare the robustness of the model. We also use the model to provide ex-post estimates of 
adverse selection in the transfer program and to identify the characteristics of those firms actually 
selected to participate versus the characteristics of other eligible firms that either decided not to 
participate or which were not chosen to participate. Whereas no explicit hypothesis is tested in this 
segment of the paper, some stylized facts are gleaned from the data. 
III DATA AND BUSINESS RISK 
                                                     
6 Whether the transfer takes place in the form of a lump sum or some kind of intertemporal distribution scheme 
depends on the distribution of information among the parties involved. Under perfect information the authorities could 
simply allocate an appropriate lump sum transfer to needy firms. However, as is more likely the case, the allocation of 
the transfer takes place under imperfect information so that the authorities are forced to devise some kind of mechanism 
to acomplish this goal. An analysis of this problem is outside the scope of this paper. The interested reader is referred to 
Laffont and Tirole (1993) for a taxonomy of such schemes. 
7In many ways liquidity constraints and negative externality have similar debilitating effect on firms. 
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Data 
 Micro data for the analyses were procured from a management consulting firm that specializes 
in public sector contracting issues. The data is current as of January 1, 19908, and it represents a 
cross section of firms taken from across the U.S. In keeping with the Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve Board System (1980), only nonfinancial and nonfarm industries were considered. 
Since all the firms were privately owned, the issue of heterogeneous record keeping procedures 
peculiar to publicly held and or non-profit firms (Cox, Elliehausen and Wolken (1989)) are not 
relevant here. Macro data was taken from various issues of the Statistical Abstract of the United 
States published by the U.S. Census Bureau. 
 Each firm in the micro dataset provided data on last reported sales (SALES); the number of 
services offered (SERVICES); the number of pieces of equipment at its disposal (MACHINE); the 
number of full time (FULLEMPL) and part time employees (PARTEMPL); the amount of floor 
space occupied by its offices in square feet (FLORSPC); the year the firm was established 
(YRESTAB); Standard Industry Classification (SICCODE); percent of firm which is owned by 
members of a minority group (PCTMBE); percent of firm which is women owned (PCTWBE); 
number of clients (CUSTOMRS); and Small Business Administration, Section 8(a) certification 
status (SBA8(a)). The number of years in business (e.g. an instrument for business experience) was 
computed at 1990 as: 
YRSINBUS=1990 - YRESTAB 
The amount of equipment and the services offered were transformed9 as follows: 
INVSERV = 1/SERVICES INVMACH = 1/MACHINE 
                                                     
8 Actually, some observations ended in 1988 and the final two years were estimated from extrapolation. 
9 The transformation of service and equipment was done to provide a more intuitive interpretation of the regression 
results for expository purposes since initial runs with the untransformed variables revealed that some negative 
coefficients were an artifact of the sample. However, the transformation is fairly innocuous and does not affect 
interpretation of the models. 
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Other transformations entailed conversion of SIC codes into dummy variables by using the format 
1=in industry group, 0=not in industry group. A more detailed description of the variables is shown 
in the Data Appendix. 
Business risk 
 A major indicator of the risks associated with small business is the volatility of firm earnings. 
This is crucial since the cost of equity financing is typically high for these firms and many of them 
lack the ability to fund projects from internal earnings (see Gertler and Gilchrist (1993)). From a 
corporate finance perspective, business risks indicate the amount of leverage (e.g.  
Figure 2. Volatility distribution of firm characteristics 
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firm debt firm value) in the capital structure of these firms. For example, Bradley, Jarrell and Kim 
(1984) found that firm leverage ratios will be negatively correlated with earnings volatility if 
bankruptcy costs and agency costs of debt matter. So that the extent to which firm characteristics 
affect sales, is the extent to which they will also affect business risk. Figure 2 displays the volatility 
of firm characteristics as measured by the coefficient of variation (CV X ( ) %x 100 ) of firms' 
sales in the spirit of Ferri and Jones (1979)10. The dispersal of clients, services and equipment are 
relatively stable across industry sectors. However, the numbers indicate relatively high volatility in 
full time employment and sales. This is not surprising since increased sales tend to lead to increased 
                                                     
10 Most studies use earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) to compute business risk (e.g. Bradley, Jarrell and Kim 
(1984) and Titman and Wessels (1988)) since the cash flow generated by earnings are used to service debt. However, 
Ferri and Jones (1979) argue that since sales constitute the bulk of income it should be a good proxy variable. In any 
case, earnings statements were not available for these firms so sales was used as a proxy for EBIT. 
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employment to meet the increase in demand for firm products. High volatility in sales and 
employment implies that these variables are unstable. Therefore one can expect most of the firms 
across industries not to have "deep pocket/long purse" to "ride out" a recessions as well as their 
larger counterparts. From the principal's perspective (e.g. public policy), this raises the question of 
whether it may actually be more efficient to allow firms to go bankrupt as a result of industry 
decline or poor management or to absorb the de facto bankruptcy costs of those targeted for 
assistance because of negative externalities due to gender bias. In the event that policy makers 
choose to compensate for the externality, 
Figure 3. Volatility distribution of industry sectors 
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 the relatively high volatility displayed by sales suggests that some stabilizing factor is needed to 
reduce it. One such factor is direct or indirect facilitation of long term contract procurement or 
securitization of on going sales. Given the similarity in volatility between sales and employment, 
such a policy would also have a stabilizing effect on employment. The volatility exhibit for industry 
sectors (Figure 3) depict heterogeneity and instability in every industry sector because of sales and 
employment. However, the volatility patterns are strikingly similar if those variables are excluded. 
 In addition to intra-industry sector volatility, the instability displayed by all sectors could also 
be an artifact of the sample since firm data is self reported. Ideally, concomitant figures on firm 
costs are needed in order to estimate operating leverage11 in each industry, so that a more accurate 
                                                     
11 This is a measure of the relationship between sales and production costs. For example, operating earnings=sales-
(cost of goods sold+administrative expenses+other production costs) 
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estimate of business risk can be obtained. For example, operating earnings for small firms are likely 
to be less volatile than sales over the business cycle. This is highlighted by the simple variance 
formula: 
    SALES Z
i
Z Z
i
i j
SALES OP EARNINGSi i j
2 2
1
4
1
4
2 22   
 

   
where Zi  represents the i-th component in the computation of sales (e.g. operating earnings, cost of 
goods sold, etc.). Thus, an examination of sales volatility alone actually overestimates business 
risk. Nonetheless, the presumption here is that increased sales volume leads to increased operating 
earnings other things equal. So that policy implementation should focus on eliminating those 
factors that adversely affect the sales revenue and operating earnings of the firms in the data. For 
instance, whereas factors such as cost of goods sold and other production costs constitute 
managerial and industry effects which may or may not be affected by public sector regulation, 
administrative expenses could be affected by reducing bureaucratic red tape. Therefore a policy 
maker could target sales in each industry for the purpose of affecting sales smoothing to generate 
regular cash flows for these companies. Similarly, reducing bonding requirements would increase 
operating earnings by reducing administrative expenses for these firms when they bid for contracts. 
IV. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 Before the empirical models in this section were used to test specific research hypotheses, they 
were subject to pretest estimation for specification error and possible small sample bias. A Box-Cox 
test upheld the linear specification for the Multiple Indicator models used at the macro level. Since 
the stock adjustment model and reaction function for new WBE formation at the macro level are 
estimated over a small sample period (N=20), a jackknife procedure was implemented to check the 
stability of the estimated parameters. They were found to be stable and other checks for small 
sample bias did not reveal any anomalies in the model(s). Further details about these procedures are 
presented in the Appendix. 
Macro Evidence 
Multiple Indicator Model 
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 This section presents evidence of public sector contracting and policy towards small firms at 
the macro level by examining a Multiple Indicator (Yi ) model to test the first and second hypothesis 
from macro data: 
Y WPOP WOWNRATE SBESHARE BBESHAREi i i i i i          0 1 2 3 4     [1] 




Hypothesis 2  If                       
 Hypothesis 1  If                       
ndWBESALES
stNUMWBES
Y
i
i
i  
where  i i~ ( , )0
2  and it is assumed that  i STATE SIZEi
2 2 ( ) , i 1 50, ,  
NUMWBES
WBESALES
WPOP
WOWNRATE
SBESHARE
BBESHARE
i
i
i
i
i
i






Number of WBEs in state
WBE sales and receipts in state
Female population in state (000s)
Proportion of businesses in state owned by women
Small Business Enterprise (SBE) share of Federal Contract action in state
Big Business Enterprise (BBE) share of Federal Contract Actions in state 
Under this parametrization scheme, WPOP is used as an instrument for STATESIZE in the 
transformation for heteroskedasticity correction12. It should be noted that the "intercept" term is no 
longer constant. Reparametrization of [1] gives the following equation 
Y
WPOP WPOP
WPOP
WPOP
WOWNRATE
WPOP
SBESHARE
WPOP
BBESHARE
WPOP WPOP
i
i i
i
i
i
i
i
i
i
i
i
i
     

   
0
1 2 3 4
 
which can be rewritten as 
Y WPOP WOWNRATE SBESHARE BBESHAREi i i i i i
* * * * * * *          0 1 2 3 4  [1]' 
where the asterisks correspond to the transformed variables (see Kmenta (1986)).  
Estimation of [1]' as shown in Table 1, indicate switching significance between SBESHARE and 
BBESHARE in the multiple indicator model when the dependent variable switches from 
WBESALES to NUMWBE, respectively. This seeming paradox can be explained by the fact that 
many federal contracts require prime contractors to team-up with women and or minority sub-
contractors as a pre-requisite for responding to request for proposals (RFPs). Therefore, in cases 
where the number of WBEs in a state are highly correlated with "big" business share of Federal 
                                                     
12 The parametrization scheme may actually resemble a multiple indicator multiple cause (MIMIC) model since the 
observed dependent variables are actually instruments for each other and the regressors constitute the causal 
relationship between the true and or unobserved dependent variables. Because of the limited number of regressors this 
line of inquiry was not pursued. The interested reader is referred to Joreskog and Goldberger (1975) for more on this 
issue. 
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Contract Actions they reflect the prime-contractor-sub-contractor relationship mandated by most 
government jurisdictions. This result is borne out in the case where sales and receipts of WBEs are 
significantly correlated with small business share of Federal Contract Actions after controlling for 
state size and the rate of business formation in the state. Further, we find that the size of the female 
population in a state is positively and significantly correlated with the number of women owned  
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Table 1. Results for Federal Contract Activity and WBEs in state and WBE sales and receipts 
 Dependent variable is 
NUMBER OF WBEs IN STATE 
                   Dependent variable is 
         SALES AND RECEIPTS OF WBEs IN STATE 
 VARIABLE Est. Coefficient t-statistic  Est. Coefficient t-statistic Labels 
  * 0  -64113** 
(11074.85) 
-5.789  -871.88 
(2048.45) 
-0.426 Weighted Intercept 
 WPOP * 38.16** 
(1.64) 
23.213  3.37** 
(0.30) 
11.092 Amount of women in population 
 WOWNRATE * 1258.83** 
(224.32) 
5.612  15.51 
(41.49) 
0.374 WBE ownership rate 
 SBESHARE* 2.78 
(6.54) 
0.425  -2.13*** 
(1.21) 
-1.758 Small Business Enterprises share 
of Fed contract actions 
 BBESHARE*  5.04** 
(1.01) 
4.998  0.18 
(0.19) 
0.983 Big Business Enterprise share  
of Fed contract actions 
 N=50 (48 states and U.S. territories) R2 0 9897 .    R2 0 9191 .    
Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations 
* variable corrected for heteroskedasticity with weight ( )1 W POPi  
** Significant at p=0.01 
*** Significant at p=0.10 
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business in that state. So that one would expect greater patronage of women owned business from 
women in those states. The counter intuitive sign of the intercept term suggests that there may be 
omitted variables that help to explain business formation such as initial start-up capital and owner 
education (see Bates (1990, 1991), Farlie and Mayer (1992) for more on education and start-up 
capital relationships). 
Executive Order 11625 and SBA Loans 
Stock Adjustment Model 
 Under the null hypothesis that the number of new WBEs formed after the signing of Executive 
Order 11625 depends on the current level of SBA loan activity, we have 
NEWBES SBA ut j j t t
j
n
*
,  

 0 1
1
, t=1,...,20;  j=1,...,n; ut u~ ( , )0
2   [2] 
where NEWBESt
*  is the number of new WBEs "desired" by public policy and SBAj t, 1  is the j-th 
SBA "control" variable at time t  1. The lag specification implies that firms formed at time t 
received their SBA loans (or observed other SBA "controls") at t-113. Due to political and or 
economic changes in the economy, the actual realization of new firms ( NEWBESt ) may not 
coincide with the level desired by public policy. So that the (partial) adjustment process for new 
firm formation is given by 
NEWBES NEWBES NEWBES NEWBESt t t t   1 1( )
* , 0 1  .   [3] 
After substitution, the model is written as 
NEWBES NEWBES SBA ut t j j t
j
n
t     

   0 1 1
1
1( ) ,    [4] 
The estimated model in [4] is 
NEWBES NEWBES NUMSBALOANS NEWSBALOANSt t t t      2 6812 0 6125 1 8453 0 0556
7 1326 0 1716
1
0 7997
1
0 0256
1. . . .
( . ) ( . )
*
( . )
** **
( . )
  [5] 
where the numbers in brackets correspond to standard errors, n=2, * implies parameter significant 
at 0.01 and ** implies parameter significant at 0.05. In this set up  . .   1 0 6125 0 3875, so that 
approximately 39% of the discrepancy between the policy target and actual number of new firms 
                                                     
13 Actual lags may be greater than one, however, due to the small sample size (N=20) longer lags were not included in 
order to minimize loss of degrees of freedom in estimating the model. 
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should be adjusted (added) to the number of new firms in the prior period in order to get an estimate 
of the number of new firms in the current period. According to significance tests in [5], the number 
of new WBE firms started after the signing of Executive Order 11625 are inexorably linked to the 
number and dollar value of SBA loans allocated during the sample period. The negative sign for the 
intercept term suggests that there may be omitted variables in the model. However, since it is 
statistically insignificant these variables would have negligible effect on the model. Further, the 
negative sign for NEWSBALOANS suggests that as the dollar value of new SBA loans increase the 
number of new firms decrease. This is an artifact of the data (see Appendix) which shows that over 
time larger loans are given to fewer firms. The results from estimating [2] are shown in [5]. Here 
new women owned businesses in a given state are significantly correlated (p<0.10) with new SBA 
loans in that state after controlling for all SBA loans and new business formation in the nation. The 
negative sign is an artifact of the fact that on average fewer firms get larger loans and more firms 
get smaller loans (see Figure 5 in Appendix). Hence the SBA effectively adopts a less 
magnanimous policy by granting less loans even though each loan is nominally higher on average. 
The net result is that less get more! Therein lies the uncertainty introduced by these policies. 
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Table 2. Entrepreneurial Reaction Function for 20 year period after Executive Order 11625 
    Dependent Variable is  
number of new WBE firms 
 
Variable 
Estimated 
parameters 
 Estimated 
Parameters w/IVs 
 
Label 
Intercept -2.6812 
(7.1326) 
 -0.3893 
(27.3243) 
Constant intercept 
NEWBESt 1 0.6125** 
(0.1716) 
 0.4292** 
(0.1869) 
New WBEs formed last period 
NUMLOANt 1 1.8453** 
(0.7997) 
 2.2784** 
(0.9557) 
Number of SBA loans allocated last period 
NEWSBAt 1 -0.0556** 
(0.0256) 
 -0.0730** 
(0.0308) 
Dollar amount of new SBA loans allocated last period 
WBEDEGRt 1 _  0.0455 
(0.0260) 
College degrees earned by women in U.S. last period 
NLBUSIDXt  _  -0.2498 
(0.2040) 
National index of business formation 
SSBICFINt 1 _  -0.0132* 
(0.0069) 
Number of firms receiving SSBIC financing last period 
 R2 0 7285 .   R2 0 8044 .   
     N=19 
** Significant at 5% level 
  * Significant at 10% level 
Numbers in parenthesis are standard deviations 
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Entrepreneurial Reaction Function 
 A corrollary to the model in [4] was estimated to constitute an entrepreneurial function as 
follows: 
NEWBES f PUBLIC SECTOR POLICIES PRIVATE SECTOR INITIATIVESt t k t k t  [ ]{ } ,{ }        [6] 
In this set up, we assume that the decision to start a business is a function f [.]  of a set of public 
sector policies toward small firms and a set of private initiatives taken k periods prior to the actual 
realization of the firm. The presumption is that a k-period incubation period is needed to actually 
procure funding, physical construction and the establishment of the firm as an ongoing concern. 
Private sector initiatives constitute personal characteristics of business owners such as education 
and commercial lending policies toward small firms undertaken by SSBICs. Table 2. shows the 
estimated parameters for the model including a lagged dependent variable. The results indicate that 
the amount of new women owned firms at time t are dependent of the number in the prior period 
and the number and amount of SBA loans granted in the prior period. An IV specification test due 
to Hausman (1978) was implemented by including the following instruments. A national index of 
business formation as an instrument to control for the growth of all firms in the economy; the 
number of college degrees granted to females as an instrument for education attainment of 
entrepreneurs and an instruments for private sector initiatives in the form of first time SSBIC 
financing. With the exception of first time SSBIC financing (significant at p=0.10), all the other 
instruments were rejected. Hence the reaction function is sensitive to private sector funding but not 
to educational attainment. Also, the growth of new WBEs seems to be independent of the growth of 
firms in the nation as a whole. Therefore entrepreneurs react to private and public sector funding 
initiatives but not to education and national business initiatives. 
Hedonic Sales Index. 
 The hedonic sales index was constructed to estimate the impact of WBE characteristics and 
public sector contracting policies on firm revenue. A semi-log parametrization was selected so that 
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sales could be appropriately scaled and negative forecast values avoided (Berndt (1990)). The 
model is stated below and OLS parameter estimates are shown later in Table 3. 
LNSALES D CUSTOMRS INVSERV INVMACH FULLEMPL
FLOORSPC PARTEMPL YRSINBUS PCTMBE PCTWBE PUBINTV
i j ij
j
i i i i
i i i i i i i
     
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Even though heteroskedasticity in this model is not specified, experience has shown that firm size 
and industry affiliation are the chief culprits of this phenomenon in models of this type (see Kmenta 
(1986) for more on related phenomenon). A Feasible Generalized Least Squares (FGLS) procedure 
due to White (1980) was implemented to correct for heteroskedasticity in the residual error (see 
Appendix for details).  
Negative Externality Test. To test for the presence of negative externalities due to gender effects we 
specify a one tailed test  
H0 9 0:   vs. H HA: 0 is not true. 
If the null is true then it implies that at worse there are no gender effects associated with women 
owned firms. At best there would be positive externalities arising from gender effects. However, if 
the null is rejected then the estimated coefficient for gender effects must be negative and this 
implies that there is significant negative externality. The results of this test are shown in Table 3 
and depicted in Figure 4. 
Weak Benevolence Test under Asymmetric Information. For public policy towards small firms to be 
effective public sector intervention proxied by the gender interaction term (PUBINTV) must be 
positive and significant. However, even if this is upheld, as long as 9 0  and  9 10 0   the 
policy will not provide full compensation for the negative externality so it will be weakly 
benevolent. Therefore the hypothesis test for benevolence in this case is  
H0 9 10 0:    vs. H0 9 10 0:   .  
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Note that under the null we allow for the possibility that rents could accrue to some firms if 
transfers over compensate for the externality. That scenario may be indicative of the fact that the 
public sector must infer firm type from some screening process. We correct for the possibility of 
this type of inefficiency below by imposing a strong restriction that presupposes de facto perfect 
information. 
Strong Benevolence Test under Perfect Information. In order for transfers to fully compensate for 
the gender externality without rents accruing to needy firms we must have  9 10 0  . This would 
occur if the authorities had perfect information about each firm so that each firm is exactly 
compensated. To implement this policy we impose it as a strong restriction on the model since it is 
highly unlikely that this scenario exists otherwise. If the restriction is significant, then we conclude 
that under perfect information transfers are efficient and they fully compensate for the externality - 
a result predicted by agency theory. However, if the restriction turns out to be insignificant even 
though negative externality is significant, then we can conclude that the specific transfer 
mechanism used in this case (i.e. a linear transfer scheme) is misspecified. 
 The effective sample size is N=120 which is large enough for estimates to be fairly stable and 
consistent. Although statistical inference cannot be drawn from the consistent estimates in Table 3, 
the sign of the estimated parameters reveal stylized relationships between WBE firm demographics 
and sales whereby positive traits contribute to sales and negative characteristics detract from sales. 
For instance, industry dummies for manufacturing, professional services, and services all have 
negative signs. Thus indicating that firms in those industries tend to have lower sales than those in 
the construction industry where the associated dummy variable has a positive sign. As expected, 
number of clients have positive impact on sales - more clients implies more sales. It was noted 
earlier that the INVMACH and INVSERV variables were inverted so that the coefficient of the 
index would be positive. This procedure was used for expository purposes only. In fact, the result of 
the regression should be interpreted to mean that when the amount of services offered increases  
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Table 3. Estimates for Hedonic Sales Index with SIC dummies 
Dependent variable is LNSALES 
 
VARIABLE 
Consistent 
Est. Coeff. 
Efficient 
Est. Coeff. 
     Weak 
Benevolence 
     Strong 
Benevolence 
 
Labels 
Intercept# 12.8518 
(0.8092) 
12.3572*** 
(1.2560) 
11.6648*** 
(0.1.1893) 
10.9187*** 
(1.1282) 
Constant 
D1 0.0256 
(0.5441) 
0.88965 
(0.7156) 
0.6046 
(0.7558) 
1.0794 
(0.7169) 
SIC Construction dummy 
D2 -0.9908 
(0.7214) 
0.8000 
(0.9108) 
-0.4006 
(1.0236) 
0.4969 
(1.0332) 
SIC Manufacturing dummy 
D3 -0.9964 
(0.4617) 
-0.5247 
(0.6647) 
-1.0531 
(0.6801) 
-0.8708 
(0.6799) 
SIC Professional dummy 
D4 -0.6048 
(0.3918) 
-0.2722 
(0.6325) 
-1.5483** 
(0.6720) 
-1.4339** 
(0.6763) 
SIC Service dummy 
CUSTOMRS 0.0496 
(0.0389) 
0.1340* 
(0.0796) 
0.2077** 
(0.0806) 
0.1772** 
(0.0797) 
Number of clients 
INVSERV 0.4158 
(0.4684) 
0.0836 
(0.7942) 
0.7749 
(0.8823) 
0.8548 
(0.8907) 
Index of firm services offered 
INVMACH 0.2316 
(0.4992) 
1.1825* 
(0.6581) 
1.5896** 
(0.6560) 
1.4563** 
(0.6590) 
Index of firm equipment 
FULLEMPL 0.0400 
(0.0096) 
0.0166 
(0.0169) 
0.0264 
(0.0162) 
0.0175 
(0.0156) 
No. of full time employees 
FLORSPC 0.00002 
(0.00002) 
0.00004 
(0.00003) 
0.00004 
(0.00004) 
0.00005 
(0.00004) 
Amount of floor space 
PARTEMPL 0.0044 
(0.0117) 
0.0349* 
(0.0194) 
0.0456** 
(0.0213) 
0.0525** 
(0.0212) 
No. part time employees 
YRSINBUS 0.0354 
(0.0177) 
0.0554* 
(0.0287) 
0.0635** 
(0.0304) 
0.0685** 
(0.0306) 
Years in business 
PCTMBE -0.00004 
(0.00353) 
-0.0013 
(0.0053) 
-0.0025 
(0.0056) 
-0.0052 
(0.0054) 
Percent minority owned 
PCTWBE -0.0184 
(0.0070) 
-0.0314** 
(0.0102) 
-0.0280*** 
(0.0105) 
-0.0172* 
(0.0087) 
Percent women owned 
PUBINTV1      _       _ -0.0012 
(0.0132) 
       _ Weak Benevolencea 
PUBINTV2      _       _      _ 0.0172* 
(0.0087) 
Strong Benevolence 
 R2 = 0.4049 R2 = 0.3774 R2 = 0.3832 R2 = 0.3639  
Effective sample size N=120; Numbers in parenthesis are standard errors 
* significant at p=0.10 ; ** significant at p=0.05; *** significant at p=0.01 
a We implemented a supplementary model (not shown) that included a nonlinear transfer scheme and found that weak benevolence still failed. 
# Intercept term exists for consistent estimators but not for transformed model for efficient estimates (see Kmenta (1986)) 
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Figure 4. Negative Externality Trend 
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Dotted line indcates sales distribution without negative gender externality 
firm sales decreases. Similarly, as the amount of equipment increase firm sales decrease. This is an artifact 
of the type of industries considered in the pooled data. Firms with more equipment tend to be in the service 
industry which is characterized by low sales, whereas, firms in the construction industry have high sales and 
low equipment ownership (i.e. many of these firms lease or rent heavy construction equipment so they do 
not own them outright). 
 The coefficient for business experience (years in business variable) shows that a unit increase in 
business experience overcomes the negative externality (but does not eliminate it) due to a unit increase in 
ownership threshold. In fact each additional year of experience accounts for as much as $354 of every 
$10,000 increase in sales, according to the index in Table 4, whereas each 1% increase in female ownership 
results in a loss in sales. So that on net, female owned firms only garner $170 of every $354 gained from 
business experience. Hence approximately 52% of the increase in incremental revenue is lost to gender 
effects. Therein lies the negative externality due to gender. On the other hand, if we assume for simplicity 
that there are no imputed costs associated with experience and reputation, then firms derive net benefits 
simply by remaining in business for a long time (even though such benefits are reduced in this case). 
Presumably, some kind of goodwill and market niche is carved out. 
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 Table 3 provides the estimated coefficients for the hedonic sales model with heteroskedasticity 
correction14. The gain in efficiency resulted in minimal loss of explanatory power as seen by the trade off in 
R2 from 0.4049 in the OLS model to 0.3656 in the FGLS model. It should be noted that the percent women 
owned variable is highly significant at p  0.01. However, the significance of the INVMACH variable has 
an interesting interpretation. Firms in the higher sales sectors tend to have less equipment than firms in the 
lower sales sectors. Thus reinforcing the observation that industries with low equipment ownership 
thresholds, such as construction, where much of the equipment is leased or rented, tend to have higher sales. 
Not surprisingly, the number of clients (CUSTOMRS) and the firms' experience (YRSINBUS) have 
significant impact on sales. An interesting result is the significance of part time employment. This raises the 
question of whether such a variable is a leading or lag indicator of sales; or whether it is an artifact of the 
number of small firms in the data. One explanation might be that a significant number of the firms in the 
sample are involved in seasonal industries such as construction. However, it may also signal entrepreneurial 
anticipation of firm growth since these firms (presumably) cannot afford labor hoarding. 
Hedonic Employment Index 
 As mentioned earlier, the inclusion of employment variables as regressors in the hedonic sales model 
raises the question of causality. That is, does high employment cause high sales or does high sales cause 
high employment? If we assume that firms plan ahead and staff in anticipation of economic booms then it 
may be plausible to believe that high employment causes high sales. Most importantly, part time 
employment may be indicative of entrepreneurial anticipation of future firm growth in those industries 
where seasonal employment is not the norm. Because of the cross sectional nature of the data set the 
direction of causality could not be determined from lead and lag relationships between sales and 
employment. Thus, we use a reverse regression approach by using employment variables as the dependent 
variable and sales as a regressor. Therefore the model is the same as [7] with the roles of sales and 
employment reversed.  
                                                     
14It should be noted that results of the White Test for heteroskedasticity was not rejected for Table 1 results. However, a look at 
the residual plots indicated that some heteroskedasticity exist. Thus, a correction procedure was implemented. Kennedy(1992), 
pp: 131 suggests that this can occur when the heteroskedasticity is in a variable orthogonal to the regressors. 
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Table 4. Estimates for Hedonic Employment Index with SIC dummies 
Dependent variable is log PARTEMPL 
 Dependent variable is log FULLEMPL 
 
VARIABLE 
      No 
Benevolence 
     Weak 
Benevolence 
   Strong 
benevolence 
        No 
Benevolence 
     Weak 
Benevolence 
    Strong 
Benevolence 
 
Labels 
Intercept# 1.7759** 
(0.8030) 
1.7983** 
(0.8121) 
1.0116 
(0.7330) 
 0.8221 
(0.7384) 
0.8721 
(0.7399) 
1.1958* 
(0.6923) 
Constant 
D1 1.0207*** 
(0.3762) 
0.9942** 
(0.3901) 
1.2957*** 
(0.3698) 
 0.2219 
(0.3293) 
0.2896 
(0.3358) 
0.1732 
(0.3227) 
SIC Construction dummy 
D2 0.5897 
(1.6249) 
0.5261 
(1.6510) 
1.0100 
(1.6712) 
 -0.2257 
(0.4573) 
-0.2920 
(0.4617) 
-0.3100 
(0.4625) 
SIC Manufacturing dummy 
D3 0.0869 
(0.3594) 
0.0570 
(0.37707) 
0.3498 
(0.3571) 
 -0.3662 
(0.3083) 
-0.3237 
(0.3110) 
-0.3921 
(0.3066) 
SIC Professional dummy 
D4 0.7132** 
(0.3564) 
0.6860* 
(0.3715) 
0.9722*** 
(0.3523) 
 -0.2749 
(0.3097) 
-0.2467 
(0.3108) 
-0.2969 
(0.3088) 
SIC Service dummy 
CUSTOMRS -0.0130 
(0.0445) 
-0.0124 
(0.0448) 
-0.0384 
(0.0440) 
 -0.0501 
(0.0378) 
-0.0496 
(0.0377) 
-0.0387 
(0.0367) 
Number of clients 
INVSERV -0.7140 
(0.4578) 
-0.7121 
(0.4608) 
-0.7144 
(0.4712) 
 -1.1032*** 
(0.3965) 
-1.0916*** 
(0.3966) 
-1.1291*** 
(0.3963) 
Index of firm services offered 
INVMACH 0.7923** 
(0.3191) 
0.7922** 
(0.3212) 
0.7243* 
(0.3267) 
 -1.1870*** 
(0.2926) 
-1.1746*** 
(0.2928) 
-1.1509*** 
(0.2929) 
Index of firm equipment 
EMPLOYMENT -0.0051 
(0.0091) 
-0.0054 
(0.0101) 
-0.0050 
(0.0103) 
 -0.0009 
(0.0098) 
-0.0008 
(0.0098) 
-0.0027 
(0.0097) 
No. of employeesc 
FLORSPC -1.601x10-9 
(1.658x10-8) 
-1.414x10-9 
(1.67x10-8) 
1.244x10-9 
(1.708x10-8) 
 7.390x10-9 
(1.585x10-8) 
7.011x10-9 
(1.585x10-8 
6.924x10-9 
(1.588x10-8 
Amount of floor space 
LNSALES 0.0345 
(0.04597) 
0.0337 
(0.0463) 
0.0560 
(0.0460) 
 0.1296*** 
(0.0435) 
0.1277*** 
(0.0435) 
0.1207*** 
(0.0432) 
Log of reported sales 
YRSINBUS -0.0068 
(0.0199) 
-0.0058 
(0.0203) 
-0.0137 
(0.0204) 
 0.0463*** 
(0.0127) 
0.0454*** 
(0.01277) 
0.0469*** 
(0.0127) 
Years in business 
PCTMBE -0.0007 
(0.0028) 
-0.0063 
(0.0028) 
-0.0013 
(0.0028) 
 0.0014 
(0.0024) 
0.0078 
(0.0025) 
0.0017 
(0.0024) 
Percent minority owned 
PCTWBE -0.0164*** 
(0.0053) 
-0.0164*** 
(0.0054) 
-0.0097** 
(0.0044) 
 0.0033 
(0.0048) 
0.0026 
(0.0048) 
-0.0008 
(0.0039) 
Percent women owned 
PUBINTV1a      _  -0.0020 
(0.0071) 
         _ 
 
        _ 0.0058 
(0.0057) 
      _ Weak Benevolence 
PUBINTV2b      _       _ 0.0097** 
(0.0044) 
        _       _ 0.0008 
(0.0039) 
Strong Benevolence 
 R2 = 0.4879 R2 = 0.4885 R2 = 0.4575  R2 = 0.4630 R2 = 0.4684 R2 = 0.4608  
a corresponds to H H HA0 9 00: :   vs   not true 
b corresponds to H H HA0 9 10 00: :    vs   not true 
Effective sample size N=120; Numbers in parenthesis are standard errors; c = number of employees is full time when dependent is part time and vice versa 
* significant at p=0.10 ; ** significant at p=0.05; *** significant at p=0.01 
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# Intercept term exists for consistent estimators but not for transformed model for efficient estimates (see Kmenta (1986)) 
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 The model provide insights into how firms make decisions at the margin in response to public sector 
benevolence15. For instance, the results in Table 4 show that public sector benevolence has no impact on 
full employment at the margin. At best we experience an increase in the "intercept" term which is not a 
constant due to heteroskedasticity correction. However, that may be an indication of significance for 
ommitted variables.  
 The interesting results are exhibited by the responsiveness of part time employment to benevolent 
policy. For instance, the introduction of weak benevolent policy has no effect on negative externality arising 
from gender bias. However, with the imposition of strong benevolence (i.e. strict enforcement of transfer 
schemes) the coefficient on gender declines by approximately 41% from -0.0164 to -0.0097. Furthermore, 
this intervention has a highly significant impact on part time employment, particularly in the service and 
construction industries where part time employment tend to be prevalent. We also see a decrease in the 
significance of equipment. What this means is that firms respond to strong benevolence by increased 
staffing of part time employment but do not invest in capital equipment because they are uncertain about the 
long term intervention policy. It should be noted that after controlling for fulltime employees, sales and firm 
age is no longer significant in explaining the incidence of part time employment. As an adendum, the results 
in this section are consistent with the proposals outlined in Section II for reducing business risk. 
Significant Demographics 
 Data shows that floor space is a very poor proxy for firm size in the data. OLS estimate of the parameter 
for this variable is essentially zero. Similarly, the estimated coefficient for minority ownership is low. This 
substantiates the fact that over 70% of the firms in the database were non-minority owned. 
 Estimated coefficients for percent female ownership, and to a lesser extent minority ownership, show 
that these characteristics have negative impact on firm sales. So that minority and women owned firms 
experience a negative externality due to race and gender. That is, women and minority business owners pay 
a premium or incur a penalty over and above the normal costs associated with doing business because of 
race and gender effects. According to the results in Table 3, this amounts to an estimated 2% of firm sales 
                                                     
15 This is also a shortcoming of the data because we do not have time series observations to see how firms adjust and or 
anticipate the benevolent policies. 
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with a slightly higher increment for minority women as shown. Many factors may account for these 
phenomena. One of the most frequently sighted reason is that these groups are systematically discriminated 
against (i.e. excluded from the "old boys network") so that their opportunities for procuring new business is 
atrophied. Another explanation is that they are relatively new and small businesses deficient in the 
managerial acumen necessary to be competitive with their more successful non-female-non-minority 
counterparts. 
Characteristics of SBA Certified Frms 
 Here we identify significant characteristics of firms that obtain government loans and or preferential 
contracts through SBA certification16. The relationship between firm characteristics and SBA 8(a) status 
helps to identify indicators of the allocation scheme currently employed by the authorities. Even though 
the actual dollar amount of procured loans and the cost structure of these firms are unobservable, the 
characteristic vector serves as a noisy signal of firm type. We assume that the principal (SBA) employs a 
logit model17 to compute parameter estimates for the binary choice problem (i.e. certify or not certify) 
since firm type is embedded in the characteristic vector. Estimates are derived from the logistic 
transformation process 
P Fi i
T
i
T  ( ) [ exp( )]x x 1 1 -       [8] 
where Pi  is the probability of finding a firm with the characteristic vector, x i  and pi  is the corresponding 
sample proportion. We use the Zellner-Lee (1965) procedure to write: 
i
T
i
i
i u
p
p






 x
-1
ln  where u iidi ui~ ( , )0
2      [9] 
so that [9] models the noisy signal. Intuitively, we assume that the characteristic vectors form a random 
sample drawn from [8]. Since   is unknown we assume that the principal has ex ante beliefs (i.e. 
subjective probability) represented by ( ) . However, beliefs (posterior probability) are updated by 
Bayes rule so that sample observations give an ex post probability depicted by 
                                                     
16 Technically, SBA certification provides the firm with additional opportunities to procure government contracts. 
17 This may not be the actual model used by the SBA. Nonetheless, Lo (1986) used a Hausman-type specification test which 
showed that a logit model yields comparable results to an alternative discriminant analysis model and that it was more robust to 
the distribution of the error term. 
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The principal wants to maximize the posterior probability in [10]. Without loss of generality assume that 
she specifies a non informative or Jeffrey's prior for ( )  so that the problem becomes one of 
maximizing the likelihood function (in brackets) in [10]. Then parameter estimates are derived from an 
iterative numerical MLE procedure18 (see appendix) applied to: 
L(  | ) ( ) [ ( )]x x xi i
T
i
N
y
i
T yF Fi i


1
1
1
   
  
-
-       [11] 
yi is the discrete binary choice variable that describes the SBA certification status of these firms (i.e. yi=1 
 certified, yi=0  not certified). Parameter estimates from [9] is shown in Table 3. The odds ratio for 
certification is computed from the formula19: 
odds ratio(variable) = exp(est. beta coeff)      [12] 
For example, in Table 5, odds ratio(EQUIPMENT) = e-0.2904 = 0.748. Thus firms that have an 
additional piece of equipment are less likely to be SBA 8(a) certified. However, as outlined before, the 
amount of equipment is a proxy for industry affiliation. So that firms in the service industry which has the 
lowest average sales among all industries in the sample, are less likely to attain SBA certification. This is 
contrary to the stated objective of a benevolent policy designed to assist the neediest firms. Similarly, 
odds ratio(CUSTOMRS) = e0.0135=1.014, implies that firms with additional clients are approximately 
14% more likely to be SBA certified. It should be noted that these observations may be an artifact of 
causality. Firms that become SBA certified have more sub-contracting opportunities and hence more 
clients. However, the sample was roughly evenly divided between certified (N=65) and uncertified 
(N=48) firms so that there was no strong bias in favor of certified firms20. It should be noted that only  
                                                     
18 See Amemiya (1985), Chapter 9, for a mathematical treatment of this procedure and Maddala(1983) for further details on logit 
analysis and a taxonomy of other discrete choice models. 
19 See Neter, Wasserman and Kutner (1989), pp: 588-589 
20 See Greene (1993), pp. 652-653 for an exposition of this phenomenon. 
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Table 5. Parameter estimates for SBA Certification Model 
Dependent variable is LOGIT pi( ) where the binary choice variable is SBASTATU = (1 certified.; 0 not certified.) 
 
Variable Est. Coeff. 2-stat p-value odds ratio Labels 
INTERCEPT 1.0013 
(1.3705) 
0.5338 0.4650 2.722 Constant 
CUSTOMRS 0.0135* 
(0.0788) 
0.0294 0.08638 1.014 Number of clients 
SERVICES -0.1555* 
(0.0868) 
3.2076 0.0733 0.856 Amount of firm services offereda 
EQUIPMENT -0.2904** 
(0.1051) 
7.6315 0.0057 0.748 Pieces of firm equipmenta 
SALES 1.393x10-8 
(5.684x10-8) 
1.4966 0.2212 1.0000 Last reported gross sales 
FULLEMPL -0.0849 
(0.0919) 
0.8540 0.3554 0.919 Number of full time employees 
PARTEMPL -0.0011 
(0.0053) 
0.0461 0.8300 0.999 Number of part time employees 
YRSINBUS -0.0007 
(0.0207) 
0.0010 0.9747 0.999 Years in business 
FLORSPC -0.00006 
(0.00005) 
0.1.4966 0.2212 1.000 Floor space in square feet 
PCTWBE 0.00756 
(0.0130) 
0.3388 0.5605 1.008 Percent women owned 
Effective sample size N=113 
 -2 log L=20.510 (df=9, p=0.0150); Score stat=15.874 (df=9, p=0.0696) 
Numbers in parenthesis are standard errors 
* Significant at 0.10;   ** Significant at p=0.01 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6. Classification of firm type 
                  Predicted 
Observed Not Certified Certified TOTAL 
Not Certified     31 (21)         17 (27) 48 (48) 
Certified     52 (45)         13 (20) 65 (65) 
TOTAL     83 (66)         30 (47) 113 (113) 
Numbers in parentheses are for Decision Rule I. All others are for Decision Rule II 
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sales increases to the order of $10 million has any real impact on increasing the odds of the firm being 
SBA 8(a) certified. The odds ratio in Table 4 (beyond 3 decimal places) suggests that current 
government policy as signaled by SBA 8(a) certification status, seems to favor the higher earnings 
firms in the sample. 
Strategic misrepresentation 
 The material that follows assumes that the SBA adopts a simple decision rule (i.e. transfer 
mechanism) 
n nX X: 1    {0,1} 
 which reflects its acceptance (n( )x  1) and rejection (n( )x  0) rate for certification. In this set up 
x  is the vector of firm characteristics and n( ) is implemented according to the estimated 
probabilities from the logit analysis so that: 
 







*
*
ˆˆ   if        0
ˆˆ  if         1
)(
pP
pP
i
i
n x   
where  *p  is the critical value selected by the SBA. Let Rule I be a naive decision to select  .*p  0 5; 
let Rule II state that the critical value must be based on the past history of acceptance and rejection so 
that  *p  65 113 is the reported number in the sample. The results from these procedures are 
displayed in Table 6. 
 In accordance with Decision Rule I the authorities would assign a subjective probability21 of 
  0 42 47 113 0 58 66 113. ( ) . ( )and  for low risk (certified) and high risk (not certified) firms, 
respectively. This rule is correct about 36.3% of the time (i.e. 41/113). The false positive rate of 
57.4%  (i.e. 27/47) reflects the proportion of high risk firms who were actually misclassified as low 
                                                     
21 It should be noted that the logit model used here implies a flat or non-informative prior distribution over the 
regressors. A richer set of results could be obtained if we assume that the government has specified priors over the set 
of firm characteristics. 
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risk firms. Per contra, the proportion of low risk firms misclassified as high risk firms is 68.2% 
(45/66). 
 Decision Rule II suggests that the subjective probabilities   0 27 30 113. ( ) and 
  0 73 83 113. ( ) for low risk and high risk firms respectively. This rule is correct about 39% of the 
time. This is a slight improvement over Decision Rule I. Under this scheme, 57% (17/30) of high risk 
firms are classified as low risk firms and 63% (53/83) of low risk firms are classified as high risks. 
 The decision rules outlined above have error rates in excess of 60%. They also show that high risk 
firms could palm themselves off as low risk firms about 57% of the time, whereas low risk firms 
could palm themselves off as high risk firms over 35% of the time. This margin for strategic 
misrepresentation imposes an asymmetric residual loss by the SBA. For instance if policy is geared 
toward assisting high risk firms then greater monitoring will have to be placed on low risk firms since 
they would crowd out target firms by palming themselves off as high risk firms in order to get 
subsidies. However, the authorities misclassification of high risk firms is more costly from at least a 
social welfare stand point. If high risk firms are classified as low risks then they would not be given 
the subsidy and their chances of bankruptcy will increase. By contrast, high risk firms would want to 
palm themselves off as low risk firms if SBA policy favors low risk firms. So that the problem 
reduces to one in which the agency problem of eliminating adverse selection is compounded by moral 
hazard on the part of firms vying for subsidies. 
V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
 In this paper, the impact of public sector contracts and policy towards small firms was 
measured by a variety of models at the macro and micro level. In virtually every case, public sector 
contracting and policy was found to be inexorably linked to the development of small firms. At the 
national level we find that women owned firms have some reliance on sub-contracting opportunities 
with big business and that sales and receipts are tied to Federal Contract Activity at the state level. 
Further, new WBE formation is linked to public sector policies in the post Executive Order 11625 
period as depicted by an entrepreneurial reaction function. At the micro level, we show that the 
DO PUBLIC SECTOR CONTRACTS AND POLICY TOWARDS SMALL FIRMS MATTER?: EVIDENCE FROM WBEs 
34 
negative effect of gender bias on firm sales accounts for a 52% loss of any incremental gains arising 
from a unit increase in business experience. Moreover, a business risk analysis shows that the 
procurement of long term contracts would help to stabilize sales volatility and increase the level of 
employment. So that indications are that the role of the public sector is crucial in sustaining the 
growth of small businesses and facilitating employment. However, the ex-post evidence from a 
simple decision rule attributed to the SBA, shows that the incidence of adverse selection is quite 
high in these programs. Moreover, even a successful reduction of adverse selection is complicated 
by the prospect of moral hazard exhibited by selected firms. The evidence in this paper suggests 
that further research is needed in order to provide a more detailed examination of the agency 
relationship between these firms and financial intermediaries - especially Small Business 
Investment Companies (SBICs). Recent work by Petersen and Rajan (1994) have begun in this 
direction. Further, a richer dataset with time series observations may yield further insights into firm 
response to public policies. 
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APPENDIX 
I. Heteroskedasticity correction in Micro data cross sectional models 
 Consistent estimators of the standard errors were obtained by adapting a method due to Halbert 
White (1980). These standard errors were then used as weights in the Feasible Generalized Least 
Squares (FGLS) procedure22. The FGLS was implemented as follows. Let e Y Yi i i -
  where Yi is the 
dependent variable LNSALES. Regress ln( )ei
2  on the regressor variables23 (i.e. firm characteristics 
and industry dummies) so that 
ln( )
,
e X X X Xi k ik
k
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k ik
k
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where X ik
s'  do not include the industry dummies for terms including powers and cross products. 
Then use the antilog of the predicted values from this process to get  ( ) ( )e ei
ei v2 1 2
2 2
 ln  . These values 
are the weights in the FGLS estimates 
   XWXXWX -1-1-1 ˆˆ~    where 
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According to theory, these estimates are consistent and asymptotically efficient so statistical 
inference can be made. The interested reader is referenced to White (1984) for a rigorous theoretical 
proof of these results. 
                                                     
22 A more robust procedure proposed by Oberhofer and Kmenta (1974) and Kmenta(1986), pp: 290-291 was also 
implemented but it did not work as well as White's (1980) procedure. 
23 A detailed procedure suggested by White(1980) with quadratic and pairwise combination of regressor terms was 
used. 
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II. Diagnostics of Robust Small Sample Pretest Estimation Procedures 
 
Table II:(i):  Jackknife Estimation for Stock Adjustment Model 
Dependent Variable is 
New WBE formation at time t 
( NEWBESt ) 
 
 
Variable Parameter 
estimate 
t-statistic Label 
 
Intercept -2.6812 
(7.1326) 
 
-0.3759 
 
Intercept 
NEWBESt 1 0.6125 
(0.1716) 
 
3.569** 
 
New WBE firms formed last period 
NUMLOANt 1 1.8453 
(0.7997) 
 
2.3074** 
 
Number of SBA loans granted last period 
NEWSBAt 1 -0.0556 
(0.0256) 
 
-2.1701** 
 
Value of New SBA loans granted last period in 1991 dollars 
** Significant at p=0.05  N=19 
 
Box-Cox Test Results 
The functional form of the Multiple Indicator model was obtained from: 
y
ut t
T
t



 
1
x 
 
where x t  is a vector of time t regressor variables at the macro level and   is a vector of parameters. 
Since lim ln






0
1y
t
t y , then for   near zero we use a semilog parametrization or a linear 
specification otherwise. The plot of   against the log likelihood function shows that   0 560.  is 
the best parameter value. Hence a linear parametrization was chosen 
 
Figure II:(ii) Plot of Box-Cox   versus log likelihood function 
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DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR DEMOGRAPHIC VARIABLES24 
 Average number of clients per firm is 6 with a standard deviation of 4. 
 Average annual sales is $703,628.60 with standard deviation of $1,497,562. 
 Median sales is $247,600.00, modal value is $500,000.00, inter-quartile range is $616,500.00 
 Average number of full time employees is ten (10); standard deviation is nineteen (19). 
 Average number of part time employees is four (4) with standard deviation of 10. 
 Average floor space is 1,833 square feet with standard deviation of 6,559 square feet. 
 Average business experience is 13 years; standard deviation is 12 years. 
 Average amount of equipment is 5 pieces with standard deviation of 4. 
 Average amount of services offered is 4 with a standard deviation of 3. 
 71.7% of the firms indicate 0% minority ownership; 24% indicate 100% minority ownership; 2.2% of 
firms indicate 51% minority ownership; 2.1% indicate other degree of ownership. 
 
                                                     
24 More detailed descriptive statistics is available from the author on request. 
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Figure 5. New WBE formation 
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Descriptive Results.  
Business formation. Most of the firms (53%) were established in the decade of the 80's. However, 
there are businesses which were established as early as 1881 and as late as 1988 - the cut off year 
for observations in the data set. Figure 1 below demonstrates the proliferation of new WBEs 
established in the decade of the 1980's. It suggests a favorable business climate during this period 
that encouraged the development of new businesses. However, this phenomenon could be 
misleading since those businesses established during the early 1980's may actually have their 
incipience in the latter part of the 1970's. That is, there is a gestation lag between when an 
entrepreneur decides to start a business and when the actual establishment of that business takes 
place. So it may well be that favorable expectations about the business climate germinated in the 
late 1970's - a few years after Executive Order 1162525 was in effect - and thus resulted in the 
fruition of newly established businesses in the early 1980's. 
                                                     
25 This order was signed by President Richard Nixon to create the SBA and other branches of the Department of 
Commerce to facilitate the development of "disadvantaged business enterprises". 
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Data Source: Statistical Abstract of the Unites States, 1972-1991 
Figure 3 shows that the number of SBA loans declined in 1982 and remained at the same level 
thereafter even though the nominal value of the average SBA loan increased. Ostensibly, the SBA 
adopted a principle of granting fewer but larger loans to small businesses. 
Figure 6. Trends in SBA Loans to WBEs 1972-1991 
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Macro Data 
STATE NUMBER OF 
WBEs 
WOMEN POP. 
(000s) 
WBE OWNER 
SHIP RATE 
FED CONTRACT 
ACTIONS 
SMALL 
BUSINESS 
SHARE 
SALES AND 
RECEIPTS ($M) 
Alaska 13,976 165 84.7 751 329 829 
Colorado 89,411 1,226 72.9 3,710 416 4261 
Vermont 13,802 211 65.4 139 79 766 
Wyoming 10,796 166 65.0 139 96 524 
Montana 17,747 296 60.0 176 138 930 
Kansas 53,505 945 56.6 1,489 191 2661 
Oregon 58,941 1,046 56.3 547 228 4279 
Utah 29,810 536 55.6 1,608 256 1392 
New Hampshire 22,713 409 55.5 495 93 1858 
Hawaii 21,696 391 55.5 527 271 857 
Minnesota 88,137 1,619 54.4 2,634 179 4991 
Idaho 18,973 351 54.1 566 81 813 
California 559,821 10,380 53.9 30,651 3,668 31027 
Nebraska 32,285 608 53.1 383 170 1649 
Washington 90,285 1,706 52.9 4,534 519 4689 
North Dakota 12,689 243 52.2 228 160 572 
Maine 23,922 462 51.8 920 83 1635 
Oklahoma 63,690 1,236 51.5 757 360 2948 
South Dakota 13,374 262 51.0 147 70 726 
Nevada 18,831 373 50.5 948 131 1414 
Texas 298,138 6,067 49.2 10,367 1,480 13385 
Iowa 53,592 1,099 48.8 768 79 2905 
Arizona 60,657 1,268 47.9 3,750 387 2911 
Connecticut 60,924 1,291 47.2 5,431 426 5320 
New Mexico 25,397 539 47.1 3,026 322 1166 
Massachusetts 111,376 2,407 46.3 9,309 790 11140 
Maryland 81,891 1,781 46.0 6,839 1,279 5509 
Florida 221,361 4,918 45.0 6,977 1,271 16828 
Missouri 87,658 2,010 43.6 6,941 446 5349 
Indiana 89,949 2,127 42.3 2,321 248 8913 
District of 
Columbia 
10,987 263 41.8 2,509 799 774 
Virginia 94,416 2,295 41.1 9,509 2,299 5952 
Illinois 177,057 4,479 39.5 2,917 756 13884 
New York 284,912 7,212 39.5 10,986 1,253 29970 
Arkansas 35,469 919 38.6 839 267 2008 
Delaware 9,727 254 38.3 223 43 753 
Michigan 133,958 3,517 38.1 2,135 559 7889 
New Jersey 117,373 3,096 37.9 3,887 790 13554 
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Wisconsin 69,185 1,833 37.8 1,257 313 4667 
Kentucky 53,454 1,424 37.5 949 429 3265 
North Carolina 93,532 2,505 37.3 1,599 572 6813 
Georgia 88,050 2,364 37.2 3,838 487 5874 
Ohio 154,084 4,204 36.7 5,716 805 8872 
Rhode Island 14,517 403 36.0 535 179 1340 
Tennessee 67,448 1,903 35.4 3,616 920 4226 
Pennsylvania 167,362 4,828 34.7 4,998 918 13339 
Louisiana 55,852 1,643 34.0 2,319 550 2962 
South Carolina 42,604 1,299 32.8 1,844 365 2950 
Alabama 48,018 1,574 30.5 2,498 721 3624 
West Virginia 22,549 740 30.5 268 106 1114 
Mississippi 28,976 973 29.8 1,749 3 2062 
Source: Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1992, U.S. Census Bureau 
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